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Abstract: 
In this paper, we investigate the fiscal impact of immigration on the UK 
economy, with a focus on the period since 1995. We provide estimates for the 
overall immigrant population for the period between 1995 and 2012, and for 
more recent immigrants who arrived since 2000, distinguishing between 
immigrants from European versus non-European countries. Overall, our 
findings indicate that EEA immigrants have made a positive fiscal 
contribution, even during periods when the UK was running budget deficits. 
This positive contribution is particularly noticeable for more recent immigrants 
that arrived since 2000 in particular from EEA countries.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Much of the economic literature over the last two decades has focussed on immigration’s 
possible impact on native workers’ wages and their employment (see e.g. Altonji and Card 
(1991), Borjas (2003), Card (1990, 2001), Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston (2005), Dustmann, 
Frattini and Preston (2013), Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012), Ottaviano and Peri 
(2012)), in response to concerns about the impact of immigration on labour markets. However, a 
possibly even larger concern in the public debate on migration is whether immigrants contribute 
their fair share to the tax and welfare systems. Indeed, in their analysis of attitudinal data, 
Dustmann and Preston (2007) provide strong evidence that this concern is more important for 
individuals’ assessments of immigration policies than concerns about wages or employment. 
Such worries about the negative fiscal effects of immigration are also reflected in survey 
responses. For instance, when asked in the 2008 European Social Survey whether immigrants 
receive more or less in social benefits than they contribute in taxes, 44% of European citizens 
responded that immigrants receive more than they contribute, with only 15% believing that they 
receive less. In this same survey, only 8% of European citizens agreed that immigrants should 
have the right to receive social benefits and services immediately upon arrival in the host 
country, 38% favoured to grant this right only after working and paying taxes for at least one 
year, 37% supported it only after acquiring citizenship of the host country, and more than 8% 
believed that immigrants should never obtain the same rights as natives. There is also solid 
evidence that policy makers react to such common beliefs and public concern about immigration 
by restricting welfare access
1
. For example, the labour government under Tony Blair opened UK 
labour markets to the new Central and Eastern European community member states in 2004 but 
restricted access to the welfare system
2
. Similar restrictions are also being discussed as part of 
the current debate in the UK on this very issue in regard to Bulgaria and Romania. It is thus 
surprising that there is so little research that provides substantive evidence on immigrants’ fiscal 
contribution. 
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 See also Boeri (2010). 
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 Citizens of new EU member states gained access to income-related benefits (income support, pension credit, 
jobseeker’s allowance, housing benefit and council tax benefit) only after 12 months of continuous employment in 
the UK. 
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In this paper, we study the fiscal impact of immigration to the UK, a country in which concerns 
about immigration seem frequently articulated
3
, by examining UK immigrants’ net fiscal 
contribution over the period from 1995 to 2011. In doing so, we distinguish between all 
immigrants who resided in the UK in the years from 1995 onwards, and immigrants who arrived 
since 2000. In what follows, we will refer to the latter group as “recent immigrants”. We further 
distinguish two groups, immigrants from countries that are not part of the European Economic 
Area (EEA) and immigrants from EEA countries. This is a decidedly meaningful distinction 
given the current debates about free labour movement between the UK and other European 
countries, and given the radical shift in immigration from predominantly Commonwealth 
countries to European countries, particularly Eastern and Central European countries.  
 
By assigning individuals their share of cost for each item of government expenditure and 
identifying their contribution to each source of government revenues, we are able to provide 
precise estimates for each year since 1995 (2001 for recent immigrants) on both the overall 
expenditure on the respective immigrant populations and the revenues they have produced in 
comparison to native born workers. Thus, although our approach is “static” in the sense that we 
do not compute the hypothetical life cycle contributions for each immigrant at one point in time, 
it is also dynamic in that we provide a clean picture of the UK immigrant populations’ net 
contribution to the tax and benefit system over 17 years. It is this calculation that we believe is 
important for the public debate on the fiscal effects of immigration. 
 
Our analysis not only builds on but goes substantially beyond previous studies of the fiscal 
effects of immigration for the UK, which are more limited in scope. Several such studies, for 
example, focus on all immigrants irrespective of migration seniority and address only specific 
years (see e.g. Gott and Johnston (2002), Rowthorn (2008) and Sriskandarajah, Cooley and Reed 
(2005)). Whereas some analyses concentrate only on the difference between direct taxes paid by 
immigrants, including social security contributions, and the social transfers they receive (OECD 
2013), others investigate only certain sub-populations, such as immigrants from the eight Central 
                                                 
3
 According to the Autumn 2012 Eurobarometer, 24% of UK citizens, as opposed to an average 8% of EU residents, 
believe that immigration represents one of the two most important issues facing the country. 
(http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb78/eb78_publ_en.pdf) 
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and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in May 2004, and that came to be collectively 
known as A8 immigrants (see Dustmann, Frattini and Halls (2010))
4
.  
 
Although our analysis requires a number of important assumptions – detailed more fully in the 
next section of this paper – when faced with an option about alternative ways of allocating fiscal 
costs to immigrants we have chosen throughout the paper to calculate a “worst case” scenario, 
from the immigrants’ standpoint, in the sense that the net fiscal impact of migrants is most likely 
to be more positive than our estimates suggest.  
 
Besides providing analysis on the net fiscal impact of immigrants to the tax- and welfare system 
for these different groups, and for the period since 1995, we also provide additional analysis 
based on particular sets of questions in the British Labour Force Survey (LFS) that ask 
respondents about receipt of state benefits and tax credits or social housing. These responses 
allow for an additional assessment on these particular transfers, and allow us to illustrate receipt 
of such transfers for the different immigrant populations, and how these transfers have evolved 
over time, in comparison to natives. 
 
The perhaps most important finding of our analysis is that immigrants are overall less likely than 
natives to receive state benefits or tax credits, and similarly likely to live in social housing as 
natives in the same region.  Some differences do emerge, however, between immigrants from the 
European Economic Area (EEA) and those from outside Europe (non-EEA). Whereas EEA 
immigrants have made an overall positive fiscal contribution to the UK, the net fiscal balance of 
non-EEA immigrants is negative, as it is for natives.  
 
Recent immigrants, i.e. those who arrived since 2000, are less likely to both receiving benefits 
and living in social housing than natives. Furthermore, recent immigrants, both those from EEA 
and non-EEA countries have made a positive net contribution to the UK fiscal system despite the 
UK’s running a budget deficit over most of the 2000s.  
 
                                                 
4
 See Barrett and McCarthy (2008) and Drinkwater and Robinson (2013) for related studies on the welfare 
participation of immigrants in the UK. 
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 We also show that, if the marginal cost of providing fixed public goods to immigrants is (close 
to) zero, then immigration, by sharing their provision costs among a larger pool of people, allows 
substantial implicit savings to the native population. Overall, therefore, our analysis draws a 
positive picture of fiscal effects immigration has had on the UK. In particular those immigrants 
who arrived since 2000, and here especially those from the EEA countries, have – through their 
positive net fiscal contribution – helped to reduce the fiscal burden for native workers.  
 
The paper unfolds as follows. In the next section, we provide a detailed discussion of our 
conceptual framework, the assumptions made and our measures for the expenditures and 
revenues that underlie our analysis. Section 3 outlines our data, section 4 provides a brief 
assessment of UK migration over the period studied, section 5 reports our results and section 6 
concludes the paper.  
2. Conceptual Issues and Measurement  
2.1 Conceptual issues 
The assessment of the fiscal contribution of immigrants typically assigns to each individual the 
estimated tax revenue that this individual contributes, and the expenditures in terms of benefit 
payments and public services that this individual receives. To achieve this requires detailed data 
on the various items of government revenues and expenditures, which is not always available. 
Moreover, it requires the researcher to credibly estimate for all items the amount which is 
attributable to each individual or group of individuals. This estimation exercise has to rely on 
rich survey data on the population of interest, complemented by administrative data sources. We 
describe in the next section how precisely we compute these numbers, and how we deal with 
incomplete information.  
 
But even if there were no deficiencies in the underlying data, there are a  number of conceptual 
issues that arise, in particular in relationship to how contributions of, and expenditures on 
immigrants should be allocated (see Rowthorn (2008) for further discussion). For example a first 
important issue that has to be resolved is how to allocate the cost of education. As primary and 
secondary education in most countries is heavily subsidised, precisely how the cost of education 
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of immigrant children is allocated across populations will be important, in particular when 
fertility of immigrants is higher than that of natives. A related question has to do with the 
education immigrants bring with them, the cost of which has been borne by the country of origin. 
Similarly, how should public goods be allocated that are “fixed” in supply, i.e. goods where the 
provision does not increase with population growth. In this section, we discuss how we deal with 
these challenges. Overall, we will take a very cautious approach, in the sense that any of the 
numbers we present below are likely to be an underestimate of the net contribution immigrants 
make to the tax- and welfare system. 
 
2.1.1 Second generation immigrants  
How should one classify second generation immigrants, i.e. the UK-born children of immigrants, 
in an analysis of the fiscal contribution of immigrants? In most education systems, primary and 
secondary education is heavily subsidised through tax contributions of the working population. 
Thus, financing of education of the next generation is part of an intergenerational contract, where 
the working population finances the education of the  next generation, which will in turn finance 
the next generation and – depending on the pension system – the current working populations’ 
retirement costs (see e.g. Boldrin and Montes (2005) and Rangel (2003)). The children of 
immigrants therefore will, if they remain in the receiving country, contribute to the education of 
the next generation, and the pensions of the current working population. In that sense, they will 
in the future pay off the investments made into their educational formation. Thus, immigrant 
children, though consuming public services while at school, will contribute to the next 
generation by paying taxes later in their lives. Even more so, as British born descendants of 
immigrants tend to perform better in public schools and acquire more education (see Dustmann, 
Machin and Schoenberg (2011) for evidence of the descendants of minority immigrants, and 
Dustmann and Theodoropoulos (2010) for overall educational attainments of British born 
descendants of minority immigrants), they possibly make a relatively higher net fiscal 
contribution than natives.  
Empirically, serious data limitations prevent us from identifying adult second generation 
immigrants. The LFS does not have information on parents’ country of birth for individuals who 
live outside their parents’ household. Therefore second-generation immigrants can only be 
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identified when they are children (i.e. as long as they live in their parents’ households), which is 
also the age range when they consume educational services. When grown up, working and 
paying taxes, and making a positive fiscal contribution, they are not identifiable in the survey 
data available to us.  
In our analysis we will consider the children of immigrants under the age of 16 as immigrants 
regardless of their country of birth, whereas we classify as natives everyone who is at least 16 
and is UK born, regardless of where their parents were born
5
. Note that this choice implies that 
we neglect the contribution the children of immigrants will make in turn when they enter the 
labour market. Further, we also neglect the costs of educating the immigrants themselves, which 
– other than the cost of educating the workforce that is native born – has not been borne by 
British taxpayers, but by taxpayers in the origin country. Thus, we are taking a very cautious 
approach, in the sense that we assign public expenditures to immigrants, while not assigning to 
them the educational expenditure contributions that they implicitly make. 
 
2.1.2 Public goods 
What is the cost of providing public goods to immigrants? This is a critical question, as public 
goods and services represent about one third of total government expenditures in all years, 
although their share has decreased from over 35% in 1995 to 28% in 2011. Thus, the choice of 
the apportioning coefficient for public goods plays an important role in determining the overall 
result of our analysis.  
 
Some types of public goods (like, e.g. national defence), would arguably be provided to the same 
amount and at the same cost regardless of the level of immigration. In this case, the marginal 
cost of providing the good to an immigrant would be zero, and (if assigning to them the average 
costs of that public good) immigration simply allows sharing the cost of that good among a 
larger number of individuals, thus representing a form of implicit saving for natives. Conversely, 
the expenditure for other types of public goods and services (like e.g. fire-protection services) 
                                                 
5
 Since the LFS has no direct information about parents’ country of birth, we can infer it only for individuals who 
live in the same household as their parents. For this reason, we have limited our attention to second-generation 
immigrants under the age of 16, who presumably do not live alone. Further, we have dropped from our sample all 
individuals under 16 who do not live with their parents (e.g. those living with their grandparents or other adults). 
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will increase as a result of immigration, although probably less than proportionately (in other 
words, the marginal cost is likely to be smaller than the average cost). If we could measure the 
marginal cost of provision of each public good, we could assign this to every new immigrant. 
Unfortunately, though, we have no data about the marginal cost of public good provisions, and 
all we know is the average cost (the ratio of total expenditure for the good to the total 
population). 
Although it is therefore likely that the marginal cost of public goods provision is lower than its 
average cost, in our analysis we will in most cases assign to immigrants the average cost of 
publicly provided goods and services, which will probably overestimate the fiscal cost 
component for immigrants for these items.  
We distinguish between two types of public goods and services: “pure” and “congestible” public 
goods
6. “Pure” public goods are public goods that are not rival in consumption, and where the 
marginal cost of providing these goods and services to immigrants is likely to be zero. For 
example, the expenditure for defence or for the running of executive and legislative organs is 
largely independent of the size of the population. “Congestible” public goods and services are 
goods that are – at least to some extent – rival in consumption: the marginal cost of providing 
these goods is unknown, likely smaller than the average cost, but positive. For example, the cost 
of fire-protection services, waste management and water supply may increase with the size of the 
resident population. In our analysis below, we will always assume that the marginal cost of 
providing “congestible” public goods and services to immigrants equals their average cost – 
which is likely to be an overestimate of the actual cost of provision of these goods to immigrants. 
On the other hand, we will consider two alternative scenarios for the apportionment of costs for 
“pure” public goods to immigrants. In the first scenario (“Average effect scenario”), we will 
assume that the marginal cost of providing public goods to immigrants equals their average cost 
(as for the “congestible” public good category). In the second scenario (“Marginal effect 
scenario”), instead, we assume that the marginal cost of providing “pure” public goods to 
immigrants is zero, and therefore apportion all government expenditures for “pure” public goods 
to natives only. The difference between the amount of public expenditure apportioned to natives 
in the first and in the second scenario allows assessing the implicit savings brought about by 
immigration for natives, by sharing the cost burden of pure public goods across a larger 
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 See the Appendix for a detailed list of all goods and services in each category. 
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population – a potentially important aspect of the fiscal contribution of immigration, which is 
largely neglected.  
A related question is what is the marginal contribution of immigrants to government revenues 
from interests and dividends and to government’s gross operating surplus and rents. In our 
analysis, we apply to these sources of government revenues the same apportioning criteria as for  
“pure” public goods. Hence, when we consider that immigrants bear the average cost of public 
goods, we also apportion to them the average revenue from interests and dividends and from 
gross operating surplus. Conversely, when we allocate the cost for “pure” public goods to natives 
only, we attribute all revenues from interest and dividends and from gross operating surplus to 
natives only. 
 
2.2 Estimation and Measurement 
2.2.1 Benefits and social housing 
In the first part of our analysis, we assess the degree to which immigrants draw on benefits and 
tax credits or live in social housing in comparison to natives. To do so, we use responses to 
questions on the LFS that address two interrelated issues: The first is whether individuals claim 
any type of benefits or tax credits, including unemployment related benefits, National Insurance 
credits, income support, sickness or disability benefits, state pension, family related benefits, 
child benefit (since 2001), housing/council tax (GB) or rent/rate rebate (NI), and/or tax credits. 
The second is the type of landlord from whom tenants are renting. Based on this latter, we define 
“living in social housing” as all individuals who rent their accommodation from local authorities 
or housing associations
7
. We are thus able to construct two indicator variables identifying (i) 
benefits/tax credits claimants and (ii) those living in social housing. Next, we estimate the 
following regressions: 
 
ittititit uTXIy
'
 ( 1 ) 
 
                                                 
7
 Housing associations are non-profit organizations that typically receive public funding and whose functioning is 
regulated by the state. 
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where for each unit of analysis i observed at time t, y is the dummy variable for state benefits/tax 
credits recipients or for living in social housing; I is a dummy variable for immigrant status; X  is 
a control variable vector that includes age, age squared, a gender dummy,  and – in the analysis 
on social housing only - a set of dummy variables for region of residence; and T designates 
dummies for year-quarter interaction. While in regressions on welfare dependency, the units of 
analysis i are individuals, in the case of social housing we perform the analysis at the household 
level. Using the household (defined as a single person, or a group of people living at the same 
address who have the address as their only or main home) as the unit of analysis allows assessing 
the number of residential units that are occupied by immigrants and fully accounts for 
differences in the average size of households between natives and immigrants. 
 
When we regress our indicator variable only on immigrant status and time dummies, the 
coefficient indicates the percentage points difference in the probability of receiving benefits or 
living in social housing between immigrants and natives observed at the same moment in time. 
This observation answers a question that is important for assessing immigration’s fiscal cost: “Is 
a randomly drawn immigrant more or less likely to receive benefits (live in social housing) than 
a randomly drawn native, and if so, by how much?”. Also of interest are comparisons between 
immigrant and native populations that are identical in some observed characteristics. For 
instance, one such question would be what the difference is in the probability of receiving 
benefits (living in social housing) between immigrants and natives who have the same gender 
and age structure and/or the same regional distribution. This is a “counterfactual” question, in the 
sense that it refers to comparing hypothetical populations that are identical in a set of observable 
characteristics. We can answer such questions by including a vector of observable variables X in 
our regression. In this case, the coefficient measures the difference in the benefits receipt rate 
(probability of living in social housing) between immigrants and natives who are identical with 
respect to the variables included in X. Our empirical analysis addresses both factual and 
counterfactual questions. 
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2.2.2 Fiscal cost and benefit 
Although the analysis of self-reported questions on welfare receipt and social housing provides 
an initial indication of the degree to which immigrants draw on the welfare system compared to 
natives, it is not providing us with estimates on immigrants’ net fiscal contribution. To make 
progress on this, we adopt an approach similar to that used by Dustmann, Frattini and Halls 
(2010) and construct quantitative measures of immigrants’ cost and tax receipts. Instead of 
focussing only on one group of immigrants, however, we also adapt the methodology to study 
the net fiscal contribution of immigrants from two areas of origin (EEA and non-EEA), which 
we further break down in different arrival cohorts (arrived in the UK before and in or after 2000).  
 
Because in every year t, the government surplus or deficit (GSURt) amounts to the difference 
between receipts (REVt) and expenditures (EXPt), total receipts can be decomposed into the 
revenue from each tax and duty levied by the government, plus interest and dividends and gross 
operating surplus and rents. We designate revit as the amount received by the government from 
the revenue source i in year t, and NR as the number of revenue sources. Similarly, total 
expenditures in every year can be decomposed into expenditure for NE different services, with 
expjt denoting the expenditure for service j in year t. The total government surplus can thus be 
written as  
ER N
j jt
N
i itttt
exprevEXPREVGSUR
11
  ( 2 ) 
We then further decompose each revenue and expenditure item revit and expjt  into the amount 
paid or received by natives versus immigrants, where we distinguish between immigrants from 
EEA and  non-EEA countries. We can then divide the UK population at any point in time into 
three groups indexed by k=1,2,3 (Natives, EEA and non-EEA immigrants
8
) and rewrite ( 2 ) as 
3
1 11k
N
j
jt
k
jt
N
i
it
k
itt
ER
exprevGSUR   ( 3 ) 
where kit  denotes group k’s share of tax payments i in year t and 
k
jt  denotes their share of 
government expenditures j received, so that 
3
1
1
k
k
it for every i and 
3
1
1
k
k
jt  for every j. 
                                                 
8
 Throughout the paper, we will also compute the net fiscal contributions of immigrants who arrived since 2000. In 
that case, we adopt the same methodology described here, but we break further down the EEA and non-EEA groups 
into separate sub-groups based on the year of arrival in the UK. 
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Although revit and expjt  are observable in the data (see section 3), we need to estimate the 
apportioning coefficients kit and 
k
jt , which we can then use to estimate the total revenues and 
expenditures, 
RN
i
it
k
it
k
t revREV
1
 and 
EN
j
jt
k
jt
k
t expEXP
1
, for each group .  Doing so allows us to 
compute the net fiscal contribution of every group k in year t as  
k
t
k
t
k
t EXPREVGSUR   ( 4 ) 
 
2.2.3 Measurement 
We first group government receipts into the eight categories listed below, for each of which we 
compute a different apportioning coefficient kit see section 3 for our data sources and the 
Appendix for details of each category): 
1) “Income Tax and National Insurance Contribution payments” represent almost 45% of total 
government revenues. We estimate each group’s share of total payments from the LFS data by 
applying year-specific NIC and income tax rates and allowances to individual wages. 
2) “VAT and excise duties” account for 28% of total government revenues. We estimate each 
group’s share of payments for each of these consumption taxes by applying the effective tax-
specific rates by decile of household disposable income to the gross individual income from the 
LFS. We compute effective tax rates for VAT and other indirect taxes as the ratio of the 
estimated amount paid by households in each income decile for each indirect tax to the average 
income of households in that decile. These data are available from the ONS publication “The 
Effect of Taxes and Benefits on Household Income”9, which is based on the Expenditure and 
Food Survey. The implicit assumption in this strategy is that immigrants and natives with similar 
incomes have the same consumption patterns. However, some studies have shown that 
immigrants, especially those who have recently arrived in the host country or intend to return to 
their country of origin may have a lower consumption rate than natives with similar income. This 
difference in behaviour may arise because they remit part of their income to their home 
countries, but also because they tend to face a higher labour market uncertainty and thus may 
have a higher level of precautionary savings (see e.g. Dustmann (1997), Dustmann, Fasani and 
                                                 
9 
Available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/household-income/the-effects-of-taxes-and-benefits-on-household-
income/historical-data/sum--historical-tables.html       
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Speciale (2013), Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1999) for the U.S., Piracha and Zhu (2007) for 
Germany). We have no direct source of information on immigrants’ consumption patterns in the 
UK, and we thus cannot directly test the extent of immigrants’ under-consumption relative to 
natives. Therefore, we construct an alternative scenario, where we assume that the consumption 
of recent immigrants (those arrived since 2000) is only 80% that of natives with a similar 
income
10
. In practice, this assumption amounts to applying the effective tax rates to 80% of 
immigrants’ income.  
3) “Company and capital taxes” represent about 9% of total government revenues. We apportion 
these tax payments, net of the percentage likely to be paid by foreign shareholders which ranges 
between 16% and 40%
11
, on a per capita basis among the adult population.  We are thus making 
the implicit assumption that company ownership (i.e. share ownership) is similarly distributed 
between the native and immigrant population.  
4) “Council tax” payments, levied on domestic residences by individual local authorities 
dependent on the market value of the property, make up slightly more than 4% of total 
government revenues. Because we have no detailed information on individual housing value or 
local tax levels, we abstract from such differences and simply estimate each group’s share of 
council taxes as proportional to the number of households in the group. 
5) “Business rates”, a tax on non-domestic property typically paid by businesses and other 
organisations that occupy non-domestic premises, represent about 4% of total government 
revenues. We apportion these payments according to the proportion of businesses owned by each 
group, proxying business ownership by self-employment status reported on the LFS. 
6) “Gross operating surplus and rents and interests and dividends” amount to 5% of total 
government revenues. As explained in section 2.1, we apportion government’s gross operating 
surplus and rents and interests and dividends proportionately to the share of each group in the 
adult (16+) population. When assessing the marginal fiscal effects of immigration, however, we 
attribute these revenues entirely to natives, thus implicitly assuming that they are the result of 
government operations undertaken before immigrants’ arrival. 
                                                 
10
 The estimates in Piracha and Zhu (2007) imply that immigrant consumption is about 90% of native consumption. 
Hence, in the absence of estimates for the UK, we choose a fraction that should, if anything, underestimate 
immigrants’ consumption and thus their tax payments. 
11
 The share of foreign ownership in UK companies is available from the annual ONS “Share Ownership” report. 
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7) “Inheritance tax” payments account for just 0.6% of total revenues. We use house ownership 
(from the LFS) as a proxy for asset ownership and apportion inheritance tax proportionately to 
the share of natives and immigrants in the house-owner population.  
8) All remaining tax payments (4.7% of total revenues), including landfill tax, climate change 
levy, aggregates levy, other taxes and royalties, and other receipts, are apportioned according to 
the share of each group in the adult (16+) population. 
 
We group government expenditures in like manner, estimating a different apportioning 
coefficient kjt  for each of the eight categories (see Appendix for details): 
I) “Pure public goods and services” represent 23% of total government expenditures and include 
all public goods and services that are typically non-rival in consumption (see section 2.1.2). In 
our first scenario (“Average effect scenario”) we apportion the cost of providing these goods 
proportionately to the share of each group in the adult (16+) population. In our second scenario 
(“Marginal effect scenario”), when we assume that the marginal cost of providing “pure” public 
goods to immigrants is zero, we attribute these expenditures entirely to natives.  
II) Expenditures for “congestible public goods and services”, publicly provided goods and 
services that are to some extent rival in consumption, represent about 7.5% of total government 
expenditures. We apportion the cost of providing these goods according to each group’s share in 
the adult (16+) population.  
III) “Medical and other health services” make up almost 17% of total government expenditures. 
Wadsworth (2012) shows that age is one main determinant of health status and of the demand for 
GP and hospital visits in the UK, and that there are no large differences in health service use 
between immigrants and natives within similar age groups. For this reason we estimate the 
proportion of health services expenditure attributable to each group based on the group’s age 
structure.  
IV) “Education” represents 12% of total government expenditures. For compulsory education, 
we estimate each group’s apportioning coefficient based on the share of its children in the 
relevant age bracket for each school level (0–4 for pre-primary, 5–15 for primary and 
secondary). For post-secondary education, we compute the share of the school population for 
each group using direct information from the LFS on type of school attended by those still in the 
education system.  
15 
 
V) Expenditure for “social protection”, which includes expenditure for sickness and disability, 
old age, family and children, unemployment, housing and social exclusion, makes up more than 
34% of government expenditures. Since about 85% of these expenditures are allocated in terms 
of cash benefits, we use LFS information on the receipt of different types of benefits and 
compute for each group the share among the total recipients of each type of benefit. Because we 
have no information on the amount of benefits received, we implicitly assume that every 
recipient receives the same amount.  
VI) “Prisons and law courts” account for less than 2% of total government expenditures. We use 
information on the nationality of prison inmates from the Ministry of Justice’s Offender 
Management Caseload Statistics
12
 and apportion prison costs proportionately to the size of each 
group in the prison population.  
VII) “Housing development”, which comprises expenditures for social and local authority 
housing, accounts for about 1% of total expenditures. We estimate each group’s share of total 
costs based on its share of social housing tenants reported in the LFS. 
VIII) “Police services” account for 3% of total government expenditures. Since most police 
services are equally used by immigrants and natives, we attribute their cost on a per capita basis. 
However, since “immigration-related police services” are separately reported as a sub-item of 
expenditure for police services, we attribute their cost only to immigrants. 
 
3. Data 
Our primary data source, the British Labour Force Survey (LFS), is a quarterly representative 
survey of about 60,000 households in the UK, or about 0.2% of the UK population. The survey 
records respondents’ labour market status and wages, as well as their personal and household 
circumstances, including country of birth and year of arrival in the UK if applicable, although 
not parental country of birth (see section 2.1.1). It also gathers self-reported information on any 
type of state benefit or tax credit received and on the type of accommodation, which we use to 
identify individuals living in social housing. The variable on receipt of state benefits is available 
since 1998 only, whereas we have information on social housing for all the years we consider in 
                                                 
12 Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/offender-management-statistics-quarterly--2. 
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our analysis.  To increase the sample size, we pool the four quarterly waves in every fiscal year, 
which in the UK begins in April. Hence, for fiscal year t, we pool LFS quarters 2, 3 and 4 of year 
t and quarter 1 of year t+1.  
We use the LFS as the main source of information on native and immigrant population 
characteristics and rely on it for both a description of UK immigration and an analysis of the 
probability of welfare and social housing receipt. We also employ it as the basis for many of the 
apportioning coefficients in the fiscal cost and benefits analysis.  
 
For the fiscal analysis we use administrative data on government receipts and expenditures; 
particularly, information on current government revenues for the fiscal years 2010 and 2011 
from the March 2012 and December 2012 Office for Budget Responsibility Economic and Fiscal 
Outlooks
13
, respectively. For earlier fiscal years, we rely on information in Table C4 of the now-
discontinued Public Finances Databank – a compilation of data published by the ONS that covers 
the main aspects of government finances, including receipts, expenditure, borrowing and debt as 
provided by HM Treasury – which we were able to obtain for all years between 1995 and 2009. 
 
We derive our public expenditure data from the "Total Expenditure on Services by Sub-function” 
table of the Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA), also published annually by HM 
Treasury. These tables report expenditures for different items classified according to the United 
Nations Classification of the Functions of Government (UN COFOG) definitions at level 2
14
. We 
use PESA 2012 (Table 5.2) for years 2007–2011, PESA 2009 (Table 5.2) for years 2003–2006, 
PESA 2004 (Table 3.6) for years 1998–2002, and PESA 1999–2000 (Table 4.5) for years 1995–
1997
15
.  
 
                                                 
13
 Tables 4.7 and 4.6, respectively, available on line at 
http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/pubs/December-2012-EFO-charts-and-tables2342.xls and 
http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/pubs/March-2012-EFO-charts-and-tables.xls  
14
 Prior to adoption of the UN COFOG classification with PESA 2007, government functions were categorised 
based on an HMT classification. We therefore used the mapping in the HMT technical manual to construct a 
consistent classification over time.  
15
 Recent PESA are available on line at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/hm-treasury/series/public-expenditure-statistical-analyses-pesa    
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4. Immigration to the UK 
 
Since the late 1980s, when net migration to the UK was close to zero or even negative for some 
years, immigration has been steadily rising. This rise is evident in Table 1a, which reports the 
evolution of the UK population since 1995 based on figures from the LFS. As the first column 
shows, over the past 15 years the native population has barely increased, remaining relatively 
stable at around 52 million. The immigrant population, on the other hand, has grown 
substantially over that period, from about 4.8 million in 1995 to around 9 million in 2011, an 
increase from 8.4% to 14.7% of the general population in just 17 years
16
. Breaking these figures 
down into EEA versus non-EEA immigrants, in 1995, the former made up under 20% of the total 
UK immigrant population but more than tripled between 1995 and 2011, growing from 885 
thousand to 2.8 million. Over that same period, the non-EEA population grew at a considerably 
lower rate, increasing from 3.9 million to 6.1 million, so that by 2011, 32% of the immigrant 
population was composed of EEA immigrants. However, as shown in last two columns of Panel 
A, between 2000 and 2011, the net addition to the UK immigrant population was about 1.5 
million for EEA and 2.9 million for non-EEA immigrants, meaning that despite an increase in 
EEA immigration, non-EEA net immigration was twice as large as EEA net immigration during 
that decade.  
 
As indicated in Table 1a, Panel B, migration has also contributed substantially to overall 
employment- which is not surprising, since (as explained in Panel A) immigration accounts for 
nearly the entire growth of the UK population. About 2.3 million of new jobs created since 1995 
went to immigrants, but - despite their population size being unchanged over the period, see 
Panel A - about 1 million new jobs created over the period went to natives. More specifically, the 
number of employed individuals from the EEA increased fourfold, from 377 thousand to 1.5 
million, while the number of employed non-EEA increased by almost 80%, from 1.5 to 2.6 
million.
17
  
                                                 
16
 Note that, as discussed in section 2.1.1, throughout the paper we define as “immigrants all foreign born 
individuals and their children under 16 years of age, regardless of their country of birth. 
17
 These figures  illustrate the irrelevance of the “lump labour fallacy”, i.e.  that the amount of work to workers is 
fixed. Rather, the numbers suggest that employment has increased even more than population growth through 
18 
 
The median length of immigrant stay in the UK decreased quite dramatically, from 24 to 12 
years between 1995 and 2011 (see Table 1b). Further, the proportion of immigrants staying for 
less than 5 years increased from 16% in 1995 to 24% in 2011. Breaking these numbers down for 
immigrants from EEA versus non-EEA countries suggests that this change in average duration 
can be attributed primarily to the relative increase in EEA immigrants since the mid-2000s. That 
is, by 2011, EEA immigrants’ median UK residence had reduced by over two thirds, from 28 to 
9 years, while that for non-EEA immigrants had dropped by 44%, from 23 to 13 years. In this 
same year, about 30% of EEA and 21% of non-EEA immigrants had been in the UK for at most 
5 years, up from 17% and 16%, respectively, in 1995. 
 
According to Table 2a, which reports the demographic characteristics of immigrant populations 
to the UK, the UK’s immigrant population has, perhaps not surprisingly, been consistently 
younger than the native population. Moreover, despite clear evidence for aging in the native born 
population (with the average age increasing by 2.5 years, from 38.2 to 40.8), the age of the non-
EEA population has remained roughly constant at 32–34 years, while that of the EEA population 
decreased from 36.3 years in 1995 to 32.3 years in 2011. This demographic trend in the 
immigrant population is due partly to return migration and partly to the younger age of recently 
arrived immigrants, who are on average younger than their co-nationals who have been longer in 
the UK. For example, the average age of recent (i.e. those arrived since 2000) non-EEA 
immigrants has remained constant at around 26 years for all years while the average age of 
recent EEA immigrants, although it fluctuated between about 25 and 27 up until 2004, has since 
stabilised at just above 26 years of age. 
 
Even more remarkable is the immigrant population’s educational achievement, which has been 
consistently higher than that of the native population since 1995, with an increasing gap ever 
since. Whereas in 1995, about 12% of the UK born and EEA immigrant population (excluding 
those still in full-time education) held a university degree, such was the case for  15% of the non-
EEA population. It should however be noted that substantial changes to the LFS classification of 
foreign qualifications effective since Q1 2011 have resulted in a large number of foreign 
                                                                                                                                                             
immigration: between 1995 and 2001, the total UK population (including children) increased by 7.7%, and the total 
working age (16-65) population increased by 10.2%, while the total number of jobs increased by 12.8%.  
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respondents, previously classified as having “other” qualifications, now being correctly coded as 
having university degrees. The proportion of these immigrants is thus likely to be substantially 
underestimated until the fiscal year 2010
18
. By 2011, the percentage of natives with a degree had 
nearly doubled, to 21%, while the percentage of EEA and non-EEA immigrants had increased 
even further, to 32% and 38%, respectively
19
. Similarly, about one in two native born individuals 
fall into the “low education” category (defined as those who left full- time education before 17), 
while only one in five EEA immigrants and one in four non-EEA immigrants do so. EEA 
immigrants arrived since 2000 tend to include a slightly lower share of university graduates 
(although our measurement is imperfect because of problems coding foreign qualifications) but 
also a substantially lower share (around 10% in all years) of “low education” individuals than 
earlier immigrant cohorts from the same origin origin. Likewise, recent (arrived since 2000) non-
EEA immigrants, although they show similar rates of university degrees as earlier immigrants, 
include a considerably lower share of “low education” individuals.  
 
These stark educational differences between immigrants and natives are not, however, reflected 
by wage differences, as we show in Table 2a: the median wages of natives and non-EEA 
immigrants are nearly the same, while the median wages for EEA immigrants are substantially 
below those of natives, by about 15% in 2011. One possible reason for these modest wage 
differences relative to the considerable educational differences is the age structure: many of these 
immigrants are young enough that their career profiles have not yet peaked. Another reason may 
be occupational downgrading of immigrants who have spent only a short time in the UK because 
of factors (e.g. language proficiency) that prevent them putting their qualifications to the most 
productive use. This latter explanation is supported by the larger wage gap suffered by recent 
EEA and non-EEA immigrants arrived since 2000 with respect to to their co-nationals who have 
been longer in the UK.  
 
Since the mid-2000s, employment rates have also been slightly higher for EEA immigrants than 
for natives, 75% versus 70% in 2011 (see Table 2b). The employment rate of non-EEAs, on the 
                                                 
18
 For consistency in the qualification variable, we measure the share of college degree holders for fiscal year 2010 
in Q1 2011 only. 
19
 Not that these differences are not only due to the different age structure of the native and immigrant population. 
For instance, in 2011, even within the age bracket 25-45 the percentage of natives with a degree is 30%, whereas the 
respective shares for EEA and non-EEA immigrants are 40% and 46%. 
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other hand, is substantially lower in all years, only 62% in 2011. Interestingly, although in all 
years, recent immigrants, both EEA and non-EEA,  have lower wages than earlier immigrants, 
they have similar or higher employment rates, especially in recent years. Recent EEA 
immigrants, in particular, have very high employment rates, just below 80% since the late 2000s. 
Conversely, over the same period, the employment rate of recent non-EEA immigrants has 
hovered consistently around 60%. 
  
In the rightmost panel of Table 2b, we report the ratio of children under 16 to the working age 
(16–65) population of each group, a ratio that in all years is substantially larger for non-EEA 
immigrants than for natives and EEAs. In 2011, for instance,  the fraction of non-EEA children 
to adults is 0.38, 12 percentage points higher than for natives and 11 percentage points higher 
than for EEA immigrants. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that this ratio is lower for 
recent immigrants, especially in the first years after arrival when they are younger. 
 
The figures reported above raise a number of important issues: First, not only is the demographic 
structure of the immigrant versus the native population quite different, but the demographic 
features of the immigrant population have changed quite dramatically over the last 1.5 decades 
towards a younger and better educated population. This shift also means, however, that 
immigrants are likely to be at earlier stages of their career profiles, which, as previously 
mentioned, may explain relatively modest wages despite strong educational backgrounds. The 
profile of immigration over the last decade also indicates that today’s immigrants are relatively 
recent arrivals in the UK, which again may affect their earnings potential through initial 
downgrading (Dustmann, Frattini and Preston 2013). Their younger age may also imply a greater 
likelihood of having children under 16. Greater parental responsibilities may also partly explain 
the lower employment rates for non-EEA immigrants.  
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5. Fiscal Impact of Immigration 
 
5.1 Benefits and social housing 
 
We assess the degree of welfare dependency of immigrants relative to natives based on the 
responses in each LFS wave on whether individuals receive state benefits or live in social 
housing. We distinguish two immigrant populations: all immigrants (for which we pool all 
available years, i.e. 1998-2011 for welfare receipt and 1995-2011 for social housing
20
) and recent 
immigrants, defined as those who have arrived since 2000. Panel A in Table 3 displays the 
results for all immigrants and panel B, those for only the more recently arrived cohorts (i.e. since 
2000). For receipt of benefits, we report results for two specifications: estimates that condition 
on year and quarter effects only and estimates that additionally condition on age and gender. The 
first set of results (column 1) thus accounts for seasonal and yearly variations in benefit receipt 
and can be interpreted as the differences between natives and the respective immigrant group, 
averaged over all observation years. The second set (column 2) represents hypothetical 
differences when the immigrant and native age distributions are kept the same, meaning that the 
estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the differences in any outcomes if immigrants had 
the same age and gender structure as natives. 
 
For social housing we perform the analysis at the household level, as we explain in section 2.2.1, 
and we report the same specifications, but we further condition on regional dummies (column 4) 
and regional dummies plus age controls (column 5). Conditioning on regional dummies accounts 
for the fact that 42% of the immigrant population live in London, which has a high density of 
socially housed individuals
21
. These estimations therefore represent the hypothetical differences 
between immigrants and natives if their gender composition, age distribution and geographic 
distributions were the same. Finally, in the last row of each panel, we report the average 
percentage of recipients for natives over the period considered.  
 
                                                 
20
 As we explain in section 3, we do not have information on welfare receipt in the LFS before 1998. 
21
 Over 24% of native households in Greater London live in social housing, compared to a national average of 20%. 
The proportion of native households in social housing is the same in Greater Manchester, and higher only in Tyne 
and Wear (32%), South Yorkshire and the metropolitan countries of West Midlands (26%) and Scotland (28%). 
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5.1.1 Overall Immigrant Population, all years 
 
The last row of panel A in Table 3 shows that according to the LFS, over the years 1998-2011, 
37% of natives were receiving some type of state benefit or tax credit. The table entries indicate 
that, even when we keep the age structures the same, immigrants overall have a lower probability 
than natives of receiving state benefits or tax credits. Clear differences emerge, however, 
between EEA immigrants, who are 8 percentage points less likely than natives to receive 
transfers or state benefits, and non-EEA immigrants, who are 1.2 percentage points less likely to 
be benefit recipients. When the same age structure is maintained for immigrants and natives, 
EEA immigrants show  a -4.7 percentage points difference, but non-EEA immigrants have 
basically the same probability of drawing benefits or tax credits as natives (they are just 0.8 
percentage points more likely to receive a transfer).  
In columns 3–5, we report the estimates in which the outcome variable is whether or not the 
respondent’s household lives in social housing: over the period 1995-2011 the LFS indicates that 
20% of native households were living in social housing, as indicated in the last row of Panel A. 
Although we find that immigrants overall are slightly more likely to live in social housing (by 
almost 2 percentage points), stark differences again emerge between non-EEA immigrants, who 
are over 3 percentage points more likely to live in social housing, and EEA immigrants, who are 
3 percentage points less likely to do so. Yet again, however, this difference may be attributable 
to immigrants being predominantly located in urban areas, especially London, where social 
housing is far more widespread than in the rest of the country. In fact, on average over the years 
1995-2011, London is home to 33% of EEA and 44% of non-EEA immigrant households, as 
compared to just under 9% of natives. Indeed, when we condition on region of residence 
(column 4), the difference between immigrants and natives becomes negligible (0.2 percentage 
points). Conditioning additionally on average household age (thereby comparing immigrant and 
native households with the same age structure and the same allocation across UK regions), in 
column 5, does not significantly affect the results. 
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5.1.2 Arrivals since 2000, years 2001-2011 
  
For the more recently arrived cohorts (i.e. those who arrived since 2000), the pattern of estimates 
is similar, but magnitudes differ, and we present results in Panel B of Table 3.  Recent 
immigrants are far less likely than natives to draw state benefits or receive tax credits both 
overall (17.8 percentage points, column 1) and in comparison to natives with the same age 
structure (8.4 percentage points, column 2). These numbers are quite similar for EEA and non-
EEA immigrants. Recent immigrants overall are also 0.6 percentage points less likely than 
natives to live in social housing, a probability gap that increases to 7.5 percentage points for 
recent EEA immigrants. Recent non-EEA immigrants, in contrast, are 2.6 percentage points 
more likely than natives to live in social housing. Again, the concentration in London leads to a 
slightly higher social housing uptake for all immigrant groups, as illustrated by the differences 
between columns 3 and 4. Column 5 clearly shows that, even when we condition on age in 
addition to region of residence, recent immigrants overall are over 3 percentage points less likely 
to live in social housing than natives.  
 
5.2 Expenditures and revenues 
 
Table 4a presents the results of our analysis for overall expenditures and revenues, which in the 
upper block are calculated in millions of current GBP for the native and the resident EEA and 
non-EEA immigrant population in each year since 1995. In the next two pairs of columns, we 
perform the same calculations but only for immigrants arriving since 2000. In both sets of 
numbers, we allocate both types of public goods to immigrants at their average cost. Thus, the 
estimates are likely to represent an overestimate of immigrants’ fiscal costs.  
Table 4b has the same structure, but now we assume that the marginal cost of providing “pure” 
public goods to natives is zero, and we have thus allocated the cost of their provision entirely to 
natives.  
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5.2.1 Overall Immigrant Population, years 1995-2011 
 
Our results in Table 4a indicate that the net fiscal contribution of natives and immigrants varies 
substantially over time. Consider first natives, and all immigrants, in each year since 1995, 
displayed in columns 1-3. Over the 17 fiscal years considered, the amount of public expenditures 
received by natives exceeds the amount of government revenues they contributed in twelve 
instances. While this is the case for non-EEA immigrants for all 17 fiscal years, it happens for 
EEA immigrants only for seven years. These differences are possibly attributable to a higher 
fraction of children and a lower employment rate in non-EEA households.  
 
Figure 1a then graphs the evolution over time of the revenues/expenditures ratio for the three 
groups. Up until 2000, the relative fiscal contribution of natives was larger than the contributions 
of either EEA or non-EEA immigrants. However, since 2001, EEA immigrants have not only 
consistently had a higher revenues/expenditures ratio than natives but have often made positive 
fiscal contributions even in years when the amount of public expenditure on natives has been 
larger than natives’ fiscal payments. On the other hand, the fiscal contribution of non-EEA 
immigrants is slightly negative in all years, although the difference between their net cost and 
that of natives has been closing over time. It is also worth noting that the three lines tend to co-
move, reflecting the cyclicality of net fiscal revenues. Nevertheless, even though the evolution of 
the net fiscal contribution of non-EEA immigrants closely mirrors that of natives, the fiscal 
contributions of EEA immigrants have strongly improved in relative terms over time.  
 
5.2.2 Arrivals since 2000, years 2001-2011 
 
When we focus on recent immigrants, i.e. those immigrants who arrived since 2000 (in the two 
rightmost columns of Table 4a), however, the picture changes drastically. In all fiscal years, 
recent EEA and non-EEA immigrants have made higher relative fiscal contributions than 
natives, and recent EEA immigrants particularly have made positive net fiscal contributions. This 
observation holds true even in recent crisis years when the government has been running a 
budget deficit and the net fiscal contribution of natives – and to a lesser extent, recent non-EEA 
immigrants – has turned negative.  
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Between 2007 and 2011, recent EEA immigrants made a net contribution of 15.2 billion GBP 
(expressed in 2011 equivalency) to UK public finances, which amounts to an annual average of 
2,610 GBP per capita over the 5-year period. Over the same time frame, the annual net fiscal cost 
of UK natives amounted to about 1,900 GBP per capita and the net fiscal cost of recent non-EEA 
immigrants to about 332 GBP per capita. 
 
We display the difference between the revenues/expenditures ratio of recent EEA and non-EEA 
immigrants and that of natives in Figure 1b. The difference is particularly large in the first years, 
but it remains substantial throughout the period, in particular between natives and EEA 
immigrants, indicating a persistently higher fiscal contribution for the new cohorts of 
immigrants. Thus, these figures document that recent immigrants, and particularly those from the 
EEA countries, contributed substantially more in terms of taxes than they took out in terms of 
benefits and transfers over the period since 2000, even in those years where the UK ran a deficit, 
and the net fiscal contributions for natives were negative. Immigration since 2000, in particular 
from the EEA countries, has thus helped to reduce the fiscal burden for native workers, and 
contributed to reducing the UK’s fiscal deficit. 
 
In columns 6 and 7 of Table 4a we report the estimated fiscal revenues generated by recent EEA 
and non-EEA immigrants under the assumption that their consumption is only 80% than natives’. 
This assumption implies that their payments for VAT and other indirect taxes are lower (see 
section 2.2.3). Even under this  scenario, recent EEA immigrants would still make a substantial 
positive net fiscal contribution in every year. 
 
 
5.2.3 The Contribution of Immigration to non-congestible public goods 
 
Until now we have assumed that immigrants pay the average cost of all publicly provided goods 
and services. However, some public goods and services, such as national defence, are non-
congestible (see section 2.1.2), meaning that the cost of their provision is largely independent of 
the size of the UK’s resident population. Therefore, by attributing a proportional share of the cost 
of these non-congestibles to immigrants, we are likely to overestimate the effective fiscal costs 
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of immigration because the marginal cost of their provision is actually likely to be close to zero. 
Accordingly, in Table 4b, we assign the cost of all these “pure” public goods only to natives, 
meaning that the expenditure column represents the cost of pure public goods that natives would 
have to bear in the absence of any immigrant population.  
 
An interesting statistic is then a difference between the first columns in Tables 4a and 4b: it 
measures the reduction due to immigration in the expenditures natives have to bear for fixed 
public goods. According to this statistic, the implicit savings from sharing the fiscal burden of 
these goods among a larger population are not only quite substantial but have been rising over 
time. For example, these “implicit savings” for natives in expenditure on “pure” public goods 
totalled about 4.7 billion GBP in 1995 (equivalent to 6.5 billion in 2011 GBP), but amounted to a 
15.8 billion GBP saving in 2011. Moreover, when we consider the “marginal” fiscal impact of 
immigration, the net fiscal contribution of EEA immigrants is positive in all years 1995-2011, 
even in those years when the native net fiscal contribution is negative, while the net fiscal 
contribution of non-EEA immigrants is positive in all years between 1997 and 2007. This can be 
easily seen from Figure 2a, which reports – for this scenario - the evolution of the ratio of public 
expenditures to public revenues for each group over time.  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Although the fiscal contribution of immigrants has emerged as a key issue of concern in the 
public debate on immigration, very little evidence is yet available that allows assessment of how 
much immigrants take out of and contribute to the public purse. This paper attempts to fill this 
void by focussing on the UK, a country in which this debate has been particularly fierce over 
recent years.  
We start out by discussing the difficulties with any such assessment. These relate to the way 
particular items are classified in any such calculation of the fiscal costs of immigration, and the 
methodology employed. We then describe our methodology to compute the fiscal cost and 
benefit of the native population, and different immigrant populations. We take a very cautious 
stance, meaning that we are likely to overestimate the fiscal net cost of immigrants.  
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Overall, our findings draw a positive picture of immigrant contributions, particularly for those 
immigrants who entered the UK fiscal system since 2000. Our results are summarised, and 
expressed in 2011 equivalent GBP, in Table 5. We find that between 1995 and 2011, immigrants 
from EEA countries made a net fiscal contribution of about 8.8 billion GBP (in 2011 
equivalency), compared with an overall negative net fiscal contribution of 604.5 billion GBP by 
natives. Thus, between 1995 and 2011, EEA immigrants contributed to the fiscal system 4% 
more than they received in transfers and benefits, whereas natives’ payments into the system 
were just 93% of what they received. Our estimates also show that immigrants from non-EEA 
countries have made a negative fiscal contribution overall, when considering all years between 
1995 and 2011. This is partly explained by their demographic structure – non-EEA immigrants 
have had more children than natives, and we have allocated educational expenditure for children 
to immigrants (ignoring that immigrants arrived with their own educational expenditure paid for 
by the origin country).   
 
The contribution of recent immigrants (i.e. those who arrived after 1999) to the UK fiscal 
system, however, has been consistently positive and remarkably strong. Between 2001 and 2011 
recent EEA immigrants contributed to the fiscal system 34% more than they took out, with a net 
fiscal contribution of about 22.1 billion GBP. In contrast, over the same period, natives’ fiscal 
payments amounted to 89% of the amount of transfers they received, or an overall negative fiscal 
contribution of 624.1 billion GBP. At the same time recent immigrants from non-EEA countries 
made a net fiscal contribution of 2.9 billion GBP, thus paying in the system about 2%  more than 
they took out. The net fiscal balance of overall immigration to the UK between 2001 and 2011 
amounts therefore to a positive net contribution of about 25 billion GBP, over  a period over 
which the UK has run an overall budget deficit. 
 
Our analysis thus suggests that – rather than being a drain on the UK’s fiscal system – 
immigrants arriving since the early 2000s have made substantial net contributions to its public 
finances, a reality that contrasts starkly with the view often maintained in public debate. This 
conclusion is further supported by our evidence on the degree to which immigrants receive tax 
credits and benefits compared to natives.  Recent immigrants are 45% (18 percentage points) less 
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likely to receive state benefits or tax credits. These differences are partly explainable by 
immigrants’ more favourable age-gender composition. However, even when compared to natives 
with the same age, gender composition, and education, recent immigrants are still 21% less 
likely than natives to receive benefits. Yet again, there are differences between EEA and non-
EEA immigrants: recent EEA immigrants are more than 50% less likely than natives to receive 
state benefits or tax credits compared to a 43% lower likelihood for recent non-EEA immigrants. 
 
We thus conclude that the recent wave of immigrants, those who arrived to the UK since 2000, 
and who have driven the stark increase in the UK’s foreign born population, contributed far more 
in taxes than they received in benefits. Further, by sharing the cost of fixed public expenditures 
(which account for 23% of total public expenditure), they reduced the financial burden of these 
fixed public obligations for natives. These findings place the UK in a far more favourable 
position than its European neighbours. For instance, a recent paper by Bratsberg et al. 2013 
reveals that in Norway, immigrants are making lower contributions than natives. In contrast, our 
more detailed findings are broadly in line with a recent OECD study that emphasises 
immigrants’ positive contributions to the UK fiscal system compared to the situation in other 
countries. One unique aspect of our work is that by covering many years, we avoid the caveat 
that the strong cyclicality of immigrations’ fiscal effects may generate results that hold only for 
the short term. Our findings are therefore likely to present a far more robust long term picture.  
 
One may argue that part of our positive picture of recent UK immigrants (i.e. those who arrived 
since 2000) may be related to their favourable age structure. While we cannot compute 
counterfactuals for the net fiscal contributions of recent immigrants if they had the same age 
structure than natives, our results for tax credits and benefits receipt (where we do compute such 
counterfactuals) remain favourable for immigrants relative to natives even assuming the same 
age structure for the two groups. Furthermore, while aging of the immigrant population that 
arrives since 2000 may lead in the longer run to an increase in benefit receipt, this may be 
counteracted by two factors. First, it is likely that many of these immigrants return migrate, thus 
spending their later and less productive years in their home countries. Second, a large fraction of 
these recent immigrants are at the beginning of their careers – and possibly underemployed for 
lack of complementary skills such as language – and thus far from reaching their full economic 
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potential (see Dustmann, Frattini and Preston 2013). Hence, although their net contributions may 
decrease in later years because of demographic changes, given their far more favourable 
educational distribution, the contributions of those who decide to stay in the UK will likely 
increase through individual career development.  
 
We should also note that most immigrants arrive to the UK after completing their education 
abroad, and thus at a point in their lifetime where the discounted net value of their future net 
fiscal payments is positive. If the UK had to provide domestically to each immigrant the level of 
education they have acquired in their home country (and use productively in the UK, as natives 
do), the costs would be very substantial.   
 
In addition, our investigation of recent immigration to the UK reveals that, even though one third 
of UK immigration is through movement within the EEA and cannot be regulated, the UK is still 
– and possibly even more so than in previous years (see e.g. Dustmann and Fabbri, 2005) – able 
to attract highly educated and skilled immigrants. This positive trend has even continued 
throughout the last recession. This surprising feature distinguishes the UK sharply from other 
European and non-European countries.
22
 This ability to attract highly skilled immigrants – even 
from within the EEA, where no restrictions can be imposed – is a strong and important feature of 
the UK economy.  
 
Our analysis also highlights questions that that are less explored and should be addressed in 
future research. One such issue is the remigration of immigrants.. For instance, if immigrants 
tend to return to their country of origin after reaching an individual career peak, it would bring 
additional relief to the UK’s fiscal system. Another important question is whether it is 
immigrants who perform very strongly or those whose contributions fall below average that are 
the most likely to remain. This is an important issue to be addressed in future work, see 
Dustmann and Gorlach (2013) for a discussion of the empirical challenges, but certainly an 
exciting future research area.  
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 For instance, in a recent paper, Dustmann and Frattini (2013) show that the UK is among the Western European 
countries with the highest share of tertiary educated immigrants after only Ireland and Norway. Not only is the UK 
in a position to attract better educated immigrants overall, it also attracts better educated immigrants from the same 
emigration countries as its European neighbours. For instance, in 2007, 26% of Polish immigrants in the UK had a 
tertiary education compared to only 11% in Germany (Dustmann, Frattini and Rosso, 2012). 
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Table 1a: Native and immigrant population size and employment 
Natives EEA Non EEA EEA, 2000 on
Non EEA, 2000 
on
1995 52,172,016        885,367              3,920,502          -                    -                    
1996 52,053,113        823,820              4,049,663          -                    -                    
1997 52,024,832        953,449              4,178,270          -                    -                    
1998 52,044,969        1,044,056          4,258,364          -                    -                    
1999 52,198,811        1,065,211          4,294,403          -                    -                    
2000 52,167,122        1,054,930          4,509,258          - -
2001 52,254,626        1,124,239          4,577,880          105,815           334,841           
2002 52,221,725        1,161,818          4,762,303          157,264           611,803           
2003 52,346,927        1,229,381          4,819,508          205,220           836,533           
2004 52,384,909        1,282,428          5,010,460          301,420           1,116,979        
2005 51,580,064        1,411,814          5,216,225          469,053           1,345,442        
2006 52,191,015        1,677,650          5,543,197          658,519           1,697,557        
2007 52,054,165        2,271,159          5,436,642          969,502           1,928,921        
2008 52,115,726        2,373,601          5,702,679          1,070,076        2,260,517        
2009 52,331,186        2,432,699          5,800,989          1,139,307        2,450,912        
2010 52,333,130        2,763,560          5,987,809          1,462,313        2,656,915        
2011 52,360,031        2,847,289          6,146,430          1,563,028        2,924,529        
Natives EEA Non EEA EEA, 2000 on
Non EEA, 2000 
on
1995 23,930,613        377,016              1,451,450          -                    -                    
1996 24,155,356        356,050              1,529,587          -                    -                    
1997 24,461,211        419,926              1,605,000          -                    -                    
1998 24,652,190        468,586              1,660,462          -                    -                    
1999 24,990,998        488,195              1,666,979          -                    -                    
2000 25,162,998        496,210              1,794,328          -                    -                    
2001 25,302,857        529,538              1,819,187          58,947              142,097           
2002 25,398,408        561,189              1,942,228          89,050              267,633           
2003 25,598,868        571,608              2,006,992          115,526           385,887           
2004 25,696,904        636,934              2,133,666          184,989           519,943           
2005 25,764,907        762,028              2,215,631          316,648           623,315           
2006 25,666,569        934,123              2,354,281          456,119           783,775           
2007 25,674,649        1,248,355          2,320,422          660,926           884,941           
2008 25,535,639        1,300,595          2,457,685          729,805           1,028,846        
2009 25,105,774        1,286,007          2,413,828          725,301           1,064,516        
2010 25,003,317        1,499,944          2,533,507          937,045           1,143,467        
2011 24,966,418        1,518,116          2,576,056          977,164           1,242,846        
 Source: UKLFS, several years
Panel A: Total population
Fiscal 
year
Fiscal 
year
Panel B: In employment
The table reports in Panel A the number of UK natives and of EEA and non-EEA immigrants in
every fiscal year. We define as immigrants foreign born individuals as well as native-born children
of immigrants under the age of 15. In Panel B we report the number of individuals aged 16 and
over who are employed or self-employed in each group.
Table 1b: Length of residence in the UK for the adult immigrant population
Imm EEA Non-EEA Imm EEA Non-EEA
1995 24 28 23 0.16 0.17 0.16
1996 24 28 24 0.16 0.17 0.15
1997 24 27 23 0.16 0.19 0.16
1998 23 25 23 0.17 0.22 0.16
1999 23 25 23 0.18 0.22 0.16
2000 23 25 22 0.20 0.24 0.19
2001 22 24 21 0.22 0.24 0.21
2002 20 21 19 0.23 0.25 0.23
2003 18 21 18 0.25 0.24 0.25
2004 17 17 17 0.27 0.28 0.26
2005 16 12 16 0.28 0.34 0.26
2006 15 10 15 0.29 0.38 0.25
2007 13 11 14 0.30 0.39 0.25
2008 12 11 13 0.29 0.38 0.25
2009 12 11 13 0.27 0.35 0.24
2010 12 10 13 0.25 0.34 0.21
2011 12 9 13 0.24 0.30 0.21
The table reports for all immigrants, EEA immigrants and non-EEA immigrants, the median years since migration and
the proportion  of population who have been in the UK for 5 years or less.
 Source: UKLFS, several years
Fiscal 
year
Median years since migration Proportion 0-5 years
Table 2a: Descriptive statistics: age and education
Fiscal 
year
Natives EEA Non EEA
Recent 
EEA
Recent 
non-EEA
Natives EEA Non EEA
Recent 
EEA
Recent 
non-EEA
Natives EEA Non EEA
Recent 
EEA
Recent 
non-EEA
1995 38.2 36.3 32.4 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.67 0.40 0.38
1996 38.4 36.5 32.7 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.66 0.40 0.37
1997 38.5 35.7 33.2 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.64 0.37 0.37
1998 38.6 35.5 33.5 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.63 0.37 0.36
1999 38.8 35.6 33.5 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.63 0.35 0.36
2000 38.9 35.7 33.5 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.62 0.33 0.33
2001 39.1 36.1 33.8 25.8 26.3 0.15 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.61 0.33 0.33 0.11 0.16
2002 39.3 36.3 33.5 26.3 26.2 0.16 0.20 0.19 0.11 0.12 0.60 0.30 0.31 0.13 0.14
2003 39.5 36.0 33.3 26.8 26.1 0.16 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.59 0.29 0.30 0.10 0.15
2004 39.6 35.0 33.2 27.0 26.1 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.13 0.17 0.58 0.26 0.29 0.12 0.17
2005 40.2 34.9 34.1 26.8 26.4 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.57 0.24 0.29 0.10 0.18
2006 40.0 34.5 33.0 26.5 25.8 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.15 0.20 0.55 0.24 0.28 0.12 0.16
2007 40.2 35.8 32.1 26.3 25.8 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.17 0.23 0.55 0.24 0.26 0.10 0.18
2008 40.3 35.4 31.9 26.3 25.5 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.17 0.24 0.56 0.25 0.26 0.11 0.17
2009 40.5 34.8 32.0 26.3 25.6 0.20 0.22 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.54 0.24 0.25 0.09 0.16
2010 40.7 34.4 32.3 26.6 25.8 0.21 0.32 0.37 0.32 0.41 0.53 0.22 0.24 0.12 0.17
2011 40.8 34.3 32.7 26.3 25.7 0.21 0.32 0.38 0.32 0.43 0.52 0.21 0.24 0.10 0.17
The table reports, for each fiscal year 1995-2011 the average age, the share of populatioion not in full time education having a university degree, and the share of population not in full
time education with low education, for the native born and immigrant population. We distinguish between EEA and non-EEA immigrants. In the last two columns of each panel we report
information for recent immigrants, defined as those arrived since 2000. Note that the way of classifying foreign qualifications in the LFS has changed substantially since Q1 2011. As a
result a large number of foreign respondents who were previously classified as having “other” qualifications are now correctly coded as having university degrees. For consistency we
measure the share of college degree holders for fiscal year 2010 in Q1 2011 only. The proportion of immigrants having a university degree is therefore likely to be substantially
underestimated until fiscal year 2010. We define as having  "low education" individuals who left full time education before age 17.
Source: UKLFS, several years.
Average age Proportion with university degree Proportion with low education
Table 2b: Descriptive statistics: labour market and dependent children
Fiscal 
year
Natives EEA Non EEA
Recent 
EEA
Recent 
non-EEA
Natives EEA Non EEA
Recent 
EEA
Recent 
non-EEA
Natives EEA Non EEA
Recent 
EEA
Recent 
non-EEA
1995 6.7 7.4 7.5 0.69 0.64 0.58 0.31 0.28 0.44
1996 6.7 7.6 7.3 0.70 0.64 0.59 0.30 0.26 0.43
1997 6.8 7.0 7.4 0.71 0.66 0.60 0.30 0.29 0.42
1998 7.0 7.1 7.7 0.72 0.67 0.60 0.30 0.28 0.41
1999 7.2 7.6 8.0 0.72 0.68 0.60 0.30 0.28 0.41
2000 7.5 8.7 8.4 5.6 8.1 0.73 0.69 0.61 0.67 0.52 0.30 0.27 0.40 0.15 0.20
2001 7.8 8.7 8.7 8.3 8.6 0.73 0.69 0.60 0.64 0.51 0.29 0.27 0.38 0.15 0.20
2002 8.1 8.6 8.8 7.3 8.2 0.73 0.71 0.61 0.65 0.55 0.29 0.25 0.37 0.14 0.24
2003 8.2 9.0 8.8 8.6 7.8 0.73 0.69 0.62 0.67 0.57 0.28 0.28 0.36 0.17 0.23
2004 8.4 8.9 9.2 7.4 7.9 0.73 0.72 0.63 0.72 0.59 0.28 0.27 0.36 0.16 0.25
2005 8.6 8.6 9.2 6.5 8.5 0.73 0.75 0.62 0.76 0.59 0.25 0.23 0.34 0.13 0.26
2006 8.7 7.7 9.0 6.4 8.2 0.73 0.76 0.63 0.79 0.62 0.27 0.22 0.38 0.13 0.32
2007 8.8 7.8 9.3 6.5 8.6 0.73 0.76 0.63 0.79 0.61 0.27 0.22 0.38 0.16 0.33
2008 8.8 7.7 9.0 6.8 8.2 0.72 0.76 0.63 0.80 0.61 0.26 0.23 0.38 0.17 0.33
2009 8.9 7.7 9.3 6.7 8.4 0.70 0.74 0.62 0.77 0.59 0.26 0.25 0.39 0.21 0.35
2010 8.6 8.0 9.0 7.0 8.4 0.70 0.76 0.63 0.79 0.59 0.26 0.26 0.39 0.23 0.37
2011 8.5 7.1 8.7 6.3 7.9 0.70 0.75 0.62 0.78 0.59 0.26 0.27 0.38 0.24 0.38
The table reports, for each fiscal year 1995-2011 the median hourly real wage (discounted using the 2005 based CPI), the employment rate of the working age population (16-65), and
the ratio of the number of children under the age of 16 per working age adult, for immigrants and natives. We distinguish between EEA and non-EEA immigrants. In the last two columns
of each panel we report information for recent immigrants, defined as those arrived since 2000.  
Source: UKLFS, several years.
Children (under 16) per working age (16-65) adultEmployment rate (16-65)Median wage
Panel A: All arrival years
1 2 3 4 5
All immigrants -0.029*** -0.006*** 0.019*** 0.002*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
EEA -0.080*** -0.047*** -0.029*** -0.037*** -0.040***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Non-EEA -0.012*** 0.008*** 0.035*** 0.015*** 0.019***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Proportion of native recipients
N 4534953 4534953 3618262 3617735 3617735
Panel B: Arrived in years 2000 onwards
All immigrants -0.178*** -0.084*** -0.006*** -0.020*** -0.031***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
EEA -0.201*** -0.100*** -0.075*** -0.084*** -0.092***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Non-EEA -0.167*** -0.077*** 0.026*** 0.010*** -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Proportion of native recipients
Year and quarter effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender No Yes No No No
Age No Yes No No Yes
Region of residence No No No Yes Yes
N 3495478 3495478 2162207 2162207 2162207
0.391 0.188
The table reports the gap in the probability of claiming state benefits/tax credits (columns 1 and 2) and
in the probability of living in social housing (columns 3-5) between immigrants and natives. The units of
observation are individuals for state benefits/tax credits and households for social housing. Panel A
considers all immigrants, regardless of their year of arrival in the UK in fiscal years 1998 -2011 (for state
benefits) and 1995-2011 (for social housing), while Panel B focuses on immigrants arrived in the UK since
2000. Probability gaps are computed as coefficients on an immigrant dummy in separate linear
probability models. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: UKLFS several years.
* Denotes significance at 10%,  **  significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%.
Table 3: Immigrants-natives differential in probability of claiming state benefits/tax credits or living in 
social housing
State benefits/tax 
credits Social Housing
0.370 0.199
Table 4a: Overall expenditures and revenues (in millions GBP) - Public goods at their average cost
(6) (7)
Recent EEA Recent Non EEA
Exp Rev Exp Rev Exp Rev Exp Rev Exp Rev Rev Rev
1995 268,771      252,156      4,944       4,342             20,147 16,161     
1996 275,328      259,032      4,509       4,145       20,529     16,856     
1997 278,905      281,513      5,088       5,080       21,819     20,123     
1998 288,267      297,935      5,687       5,848       22,770     21,467     
1999 299,373      317,377      6,094       6,345       24,237     23,125     
2000 316,060      335,770      6,359       6,827       27,355     26,255     
2001 335,759      340,763      7,038       8,061       29,695     27,332     521          930          1,627       2,374       882 2,255
2002 358,923      347,808      7,825       8,130       32,771     28,675     838          1,200       3,237       3,954       1,136 3,750
2003 394,678      370,891      8,944       9,040       35,859     31,488     1,176       1,813       4,938       5,974       1,721 5,624
2004 421,556      395,025      9,796       9,993       39,408     34,972     1,801       2,365       7,147       7,743       2,234 7,294
2005 446,021      418,330      10,905     12,535     44,154     39,038     2,880       4,214       9,251       11,063     3,983 10,472
2006 462,716      441,329      13,260     16,144     47,070     42,532     4,150       6,599       12,026     14,102     6,230 13,374
2007 488,136      461,255      19,314     22,018     48,332     44,694     6,540       9,897       14,443     16,990     9,353 16,148
2008 527,084      446,427      21,993     23,026     54,002     44,334     7,875       11,454     18,195     18,130     10,854 17,226
2009 560,249      440,076      23,852     22,646     58,383     44,817     9,242       11,227     21,073     19,114     10,634 18,191
2010 574,226      447,903      26,971     27,375     60,671     45,865     11,942     15,320     23,944     19,938     14,469 18,876
2011 576,847      461,510      27,895     26,162     62,071     50,552     12,879     14,622     25,917     23,870     13,742 22,562
Alternative scenario: immigrants' lower 
consumption
The table reports the estimated amount of government expenditures and revenues attributable to the native born and immigrant population when we impute to immigrants the
average cost of public goods provision. We distinguish between EEA and non-EEA immigrants. In columns (4) and (5) we report information for recent immigrants, defined as
those arrived since 2000. In columns (6) and (7) revenues from recent EEA and non-EEA immigrants are computed under the assumption that immigrants' consumption is 80%
that of natives.
Baseline results
Source: Our calculations based on UKLFS and government budget.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fiscal 
Year
Natives EEA Non EEA Recent EEA Recent Non EEA
Table 4b: Overall expenditures and revenues (in millions GBP) -  Public goods at their marginal cost
(6) (7)
Recent EEA Recent Non EEA
Exp Rev Exp Rev Exp Rev Exp Rev Exp Rev Rev Rev
1995 273,430      253,577      3,890       4,021             16,542 15,061     
1996 280,215      260,445      3,479       3,847       16,673     15,741     
1997 284,021      282,980      3,954       4,755       17,837     18,981     
1998 294,049      299,493      4,354       5,489       18,321     20,268     
1999 305,217      318,911      4,726       5,986       19,762     21,950     
2000 322,427      337,563      4,943       6,429       22,403     24,861     
2001 342,476      342,555      5,486       7,647       24,529     25,953     340          882          1,099       2,233       834                       2,114                   
2002 366,258      349,711      6,160       7,698       27,102     27,204     565          1,129       2,282       3,707       1,065                   3,502                   
2003 402,807      372,896      7,094       8,584       29,579     29,939     806          1,722       3,540       5,629       1,629                   5,279                   
2004 430,361      397,226      7,783       9,489       32,616     33,274     1,226       2,222       5,273       7,274       2,090                   6,825                   
2005 456,154      421,048      8,432       11,872     36,495     36,983     1,911       3,954       6,929       10,440     3,723                   9,849                   
2006 473,802      444,237      10,180     15,337     39,064     40,432     2,745       6,231       9,226       13,368     5,862                   12,639                 
2007 500,258      464,632      15,011     20,819     40,514     42,515     4,522       9,335       11,300     16,115     8,791                   15,272                 
2008 541,259      449,896      17,001     21,804     44,819     42,087     5,439       10,858     14,205     17,154     10,258                 16,249                 
2009 574,209      443,848      19,031     21,344     49,243     42,348     6,848       10,580     16,938     17,997     9,987                   17,074                 
2010 589,615      450,839      21,349     26,303     50,905     44,002     8,863       14,733     19,482     19,087     13,882                 18,025                 
2011 592,646      464,404      22,187     25,116     51,980     48,704     9,689       14,038     21,177     23,002     13,157                 21,694                 
The table reports the estimated amount of government expenditures and revenues attributable to the native born and immigrant population when the entire cost of
public goods provision is attributed to natives. We distinguish between EEA and non-EEA immigrants. In columns (4) and (5) we report information for recent immigrants,
defined as those arrived since 2000. In columns (6) and (7) revenues from recent EEA and non-EEA immigrants are computed under the assumption that immigrants'
consumption is 80% that of natives.
Source: Our calculations based on UKLFS and government budget.
Baseline results
Alternative scenario: immigrants' 
lower consumption
Fiscal 
Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Natives EEA Non EEA Recent EEA Recent Non EEA
Table 5: Summary results
Natives EEA Non EEA
Recent 
EEA
Recent 
Non EEA
-604,529 8,775 -104,176
0.926        1.036       0.864       
0.890        0.026       0.084       
Natives EEA Non EEA
Recent 
EEA
Recent 
Non EEA
-624,120 8,978 -86,820 22,106 2,942
0.894 1.045 0.851 1.339 1.019
0.879        0.031       0.090       0.012       0.028       
Panel A: 1995-2011
Panel B: 2001-2011
Each panel reports, for natives, EEA and non-EEA immigrants, and recent EEA and non-EEA
immmigrants, their overall net fiscal contribution, cumulated over several years, expressed in 2011
equivalent GBP (first line), the ratio of revenues contributed to expenditures received (second line), the
share of each group in the total UK population (third line). Panel A refers to years 1995-2011, Panel B
refers to years 2001-2011.
Overall net fiscal contributions (million, 2011 GBP equivalent)
Ratio of real revenues to real expenditures
Share of each group in total population
Overall net fiscal contributions (million, 2011 GBP equivalent)
Ratio of real revenues to real expenditures
Share of each group in total population
Figure 1a: Ratio of overall revenues to expenditures by group
Figure 1b: Ratio of overall revenues to expenditures by group (recent immigrants)
The figure reports for each fiscal year the ratio of public revenues to expenditures for EEA
and non-EEA immigrants and natives when we impute to immigrants the average cost of
public goods provison. Figure A reports figures for all immigrants, regardless of their year
of arrival in the UK, whereas figure B reports figures for recent immigrants (arrived since
2000) only.  
Source: Our calculations based on UKLFS and government budget.
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Figure 2a: Ratio of overall revenues to expenditures, marginal immigrants effects, by group
The figure reports for each fiscal year the ratio of public revenues to expenditures for EEA
and non-EEA immigrants and natives when we the entire cost of public goods provison is
attributed to natives. Figure A reports figures for all immigrants, regardless of their year of
arrival in the UK, whereas figure B reports figures for recent immigrants (arrived since 2000)
only.  
Source: Our calculations based on UKLFS and government budget.
Figure 2b: Ratio of overall revenues to expenditures, marginal immigrants effects, by group (recent
immigrants)
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Appendix
% of total Apportioning criterion
 "Pure" public goods 23.3 Share of 16+ population  (average cost) 
"Congestible" public goods 7.5 Share of 16+ population (average cost)
Health costs (except medical research) 16.9
Share of population in age group, and share of
total health costs of age group
Compulsory education: pre-primary 0.7 Share of [0,4] children population
Compulsory education: primary and secondary 8.4 Share of [5,15] years old population
Further education 1.0 Share of population in further education
Higher education 1.9 Share of population in higher education
SP: Sickness and disability 4.8
Share of sickness and disability benefit
claimants (actual recipients)
SP: Pensions 13.2 Share of pension claimants (actual recipients)
SP: Family and children 7.4
Share of income-support or family-related
benefits claimants (actual recipients)
SP: Unemployment 1.0
Share of unemployment benefits recipients
(actual recipients)
SP: Housing benefits 3.5
Share of housing benefits recipients (actual 
recipients)
SP: Personal social services 4.5
Average of share of sickness and disability
benefits recipients, pension claimants, income
support or family-related benefits recipients
(actual recipients)
Law courts and prisons 1.9 Share of prison population 
Housing development 1.1 Share of social housing tenants population
Immigration and citizenship police services 0.3 Share of immigrant population
Other police services 2.8 Share of population
EU transactions -0.2 Share of population 
Table A1: Expenditures allocation criteria
Column 1 reports the categories in which we have grouped public expenditure items from Table 5.2 of PESA 2010 (years
2004-2010), Table 5.2 of PESA 2009 (year 2003) Table 3.6 of PESA 2004 (years 1998-2002), and Table 4.5 of PESA 1999-
2000 (years 1995-1997). Column 2 reports the share (in percent) of total public expenditure accounted for by each
category, pooling over all years 1995-2011. Columns 3 summarises the criteria followed in the construction of
apportioning coefficients for each group. Column 4 summarises the alternative criteria which we use in the robustness
checks. Where not specified, the data source is the LFS.
% of total Apportioning criterion
Income tax and National Insurance 44.7
Share of total payments: actual tax and NI rates
applied to LFS income
VAT and other indirect taxes 28
Share of total payments: effective rates by
household income decile from ONS "Effects of taxes
and benefits on household income", accounting for
immigrants’ lower consumption, applied to LFS
income.
Company and capital taxes 9.3
Share of adult population, net of foreign owned
share from  ONS "Share ownership"
Council tax 4.2 Share of total households
Business rates 4.3 Share of self employed
Gross operating surplus and rents 5
Share of adult population/All to natives (marginal 
contribution )
Inheritance tax 0.6 Share of houseowners population
Income tax credits -0.8 Share of dependent children population
Other 4.7 Share of adult population
Table A2: Receipts allocation criteria
Column 1 reports the categories in which we have grouped the items in Table C4 of the HM Treasury’s Public Sector
Finances Databank. Column 2 reports the share of total government receipts accounted for by each revenue source,
pooling over all years 1995-2011. Column 3 summarises the criteria followed in the construction of apportioning
coefficients for each group. 
Table A3: List of government expenditures by sub-function (UN COFOG) and grouping
Expenditure item Expenditure group
1.1 Executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs
1.2 Foreign economic aid
1.3 General services
1.4 Basic research
1.5 R&D general public services
1.6 General public services n.e.c.
1.7 Public sector debt interest
2.1 Military defence
2.2 Civil defence
2.3 Foreign military aid
2.4 R&D defence
2.5 Defence n.e.c
4.1 General economic, commercial and labour affairs
4.2 Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting
4.3 Fuel and energy
4.4 Mining, manufacturing and construction
4.5 Transport
4.6 Communication
4.7 Other industries
4.8 R&D economic affairs
4.9 Economic affairs n.e.c
Health research
3.2 Fire-protection services
3.5 R&D public order and safety
3.6 Public order and safety n.e.c.
5.1 Waste management
5.2 Waste water management
5.3 Pollution abatement
5.4 Protection of biodiversity and landscape
5.5 R&D environment protection
5.6 Environment protection n.e.c
6.2 Community development
6.3 Water supply
6.4 Street lighting
6.5 R&D housing and community amenities
6.6 Housing and community amenities n.e.c
8.1 Recreational and sporting services
8.2 Cultural services
8.3 Broadcasting and publishing services
8.4 Religious and other community services
8.5 R&D recreation, culture and religion
8.6 Recreation, culture and religion n.e.c
9.5 Education not definable by level
9.6 Subsidiary services to education
9.7 R&D education
9.8 Education n.e.c
10.8 R&D social protection
10.9 Social protection n.e.c.
"Pure" public goods
"Congestible" public goods
Table continues on next page
3.3 Law courts
3.4 Prisons
6.1 Housing development Housing development
Medical services
Central and other health services
9.1 Pre-primary and primary education: under fives Compulsory education: pre-primary
9.1 Pre-primary and primary education: primary education
9.2 Secondary education
9.3 Post-secondary non-tertiary education Further education
9.4 Tertiary education Higher education
3.1 Police services: Immigration and citizenship
Immigration and citizenship police 
services
3.1 Police services: other police services Other police services
10.1 Sickness and disability: incapacity, disability and injury benefits SP: Sickness and disability
10.2 Old age: pensions
10.3 Survivors
10.4  Family and children: family benefits, income support and tax credits
10.7 Social exclusion n.e.c: family benefits, income support and tax credits
10.5 Unemployment: other unemployment SP:Unemployment
10.6 Housing SP: Housing benefits
10.1 Sickness and disability: personal social services
10.2 Old age: personal social services
10.4  Family and children: personal social services
10.5 Unemployment: personal social services
10.7 Social exclusion n.e.c: personal social services
Total EU transactions EU transactions
Law courts and prisons
Health costs (except medical research)
Compulsory education: primary and 
secondary
SP: Family and children
SP: Personal social services
The table reports the list of government expenditures by function from the UN COFOG classification, adopted in PESA issues after 2007, and
the categories in which we have grouped them in our analysis. 
Table continues from previous page
SP: pensions
Revenue source Grouping
Income tax revenue
NICs payments
Income tax credits Income tax credits
VAT
Fuel duties
Stamp duties
Tobacco duties
Spirits duties
Wine duties
Beer and cider duties
Betting and gambling duties
Air passenger duty
Customs duties and levies
Insurance premium tax
Vehicle Excise Duties
Corporation tax
Corporation tax credits
Capital Gains Tax
Petroleum revenue
PC corporation tax payments
Inheritance tax Inheritance tax
Council Tax Council Tax
Business rates Business rates
Gross operating surplus and rents
Interests and dividends
Landfill tax
Climate change levy
Aggregates levy
Other taxes and royalties
Adjustments
Other receipts
The table reports the list of receipts from Table C4 of the Public Sector Finances Databank and the category in
which they have been grouped.
VAT and other indirect taxes
Table A4: List of government receipts and grouping
Income tax and National Insurance
Company and capital taxes
Gross operating surplus and rents
Other
